Bentham spelled out the variables: how intense is the pleasure? How long will it last? Is it an inevitable or only possible result of the action I am considering?
How soon will it happen? Will it be productive and give rise to further pleasure? Will it guarantee no painful consequences? How many people will experience it? So Mill introduced the idea that there were different levels and types of pleasure.
This version of hedonist philosophical theory is usually called prudential hedonism or qualitative hedonism. Train yourself to be the best possible version of yourself until you do the right thing habitually, on autopilot.
In her book The Top Five Regrets of the Dying , the palliative nurse Bronnie Ware describes exactly the hazards that Aristotle advises us to avoid. For Aristotle insisted that happiness is constituted by something greater from and different to an accumulation of agreeable experiences. To be happy, we need to sustain constructive activities that we believe are goal-directed.
It requires being nurtured effectively to develop your intellectual and physical capacities, and identify your potential Aristotle had strong views on education , and also training yourself to be the best possible version of yourself until you do the right thing habitually, on autopilot.
If you deliberately respond in a friendly way to everyone you encounter, you will begin to do so unconsciously, making yourself and others happier. Historically, of course, many philosophers, such as Egoists, have questioned whether virtue is inherently desirable. But Aristotle, for whom self-liking is necessary to virtue, argues that virtues do have intrinsic benefits, a view he shares with Socrates, the Stoics and the Victorian philosopher Thomas Hill Green.
For part of his life, Aristotle lived in the Macedonian court tyrannised by the decadent and ruthless Philip II, whose lieutenants and concubines resorted to plots, extortion and murder to further their self-advantage.
He knew what an immoral person looks like, and that such people were often subjectively miserable, despite the outward trappings of wealth and success. In the Nicomachean Ethics , he wrote all translations my own :. Every human being can practise a way of life that will make him happier. Aristotle is not offering a magic wand to erase all threats to happiness.
There are indeed some qualifications to the universal capacity for pursuing happiness. It is harder to achieve happiness. But not impossible. You do not need material possessions or physical strength or beauty to start exercising your mind in company with Aristotle, since the way of life he advocates concerns a moral and psychological excellence rather than one that lies in material possessions or bodily splendour.
There are, he acknowledges, even more difficult obstacles: having children or friends who are completely depraved is one such obstacle. Another — which Aristotle saves until last and elsewhere implies is the most difficult problem any human can ever face — is the loss of fine friends in whom you have invested effort, or especially the loss of children, through death.
Yet, potentially, even people poorly endowed by nature or who have experienced terrible bereavements can live a good life. Aristotle insists that individuals who want to treat others fairly need to love themselves. Friendships are important to the Aristotelian, and adopting virtue ethics need not disrupt your life. We might be able to cope alone, but why would we ever choose isolation? Nor is it ever too late: you can decide to retrain yourself morally at any point in your life.
Most appealing of all, Aristotle insists that individuals who want to treat others fairly need to love themselves. There is no room for self-hatred, self-flagellation or self-deprivation in his humane system.
Aristotle saw long before Sigmund Freud that our biological instincts are natural rather than morally despicable. This makes his ethics compatible with modern psychoanalysis.
An innovative Aristotelian idea is that supposedly reprehensible emotions — even anger and vengefulness — are indispensable to a healthy psyche. Sexual desire, since humans are animals, is excellent in proportion. Either excessive or insufficient sexual appetite is conducive to unhappiness. Anger is also essential to a flourishing personality. Yet anger in excess or with the wrong people is a vice. There are no strict doctrines. Intention is always a crucial gauge of right behaviour: he writes penetratingly about the problems that arise when intended altruistic ends require immoral means.
But every ethical situation is different. So far, not so good. What I have said of Aristotle's approach makes it sound hopelessly class and culture-bound. Does Aristotle have anything more transcendent to teach us? There are a number of different points. We should treat these separately on their merits. As a second stage we might consider how they might be seen as implications of a single ethical theory or perspective.
The good for human beings is what enables them to fulfil the way of life that is natural to them. There is a way of life that is natural to human beings. This is done by practising the virtues - the good life is the life in which one practises virtue. If you ask what is the good life for a particular animal or plant the answer does not seem terribly obscure.
Think of a rhododendron. The label when you buy a new one from the garden centre will give you a list of the things you should do to make sure your new plant flourishes.
It needs acid soil, some shade, shelter from wind, protection from frost, mulching, ericaceous fertilizer twice a year. Provide these things and if the advice is right this particular species will flourish.
It will put on growth each year, show healthy-looking foliage, flower in May, enjoy the life span of the species. So on the one hand with a rhododendron there is a form and pattern of life and a life span that is characteristic of the species, and a list of things you can do which help a particular specimen reach this characteristic pattern.
So you have a conception here, in the case of a plant, of its good, and of what is good for it. What is good for it is whatever helps it attain the pattern of life that is characteristic of the species it belongs to. Take a frog. It needs water, Spring to come on cue, partners to enjoy, flies to eat. In what sense of 'need'? It needs these things in order to live the life that is characteristic of the frog.
A frog wouldn't necessarily die if it lacked say friends in February. But it wouldn't be able to make tadpoles. The full characteristic life of the frog would not be open to it. That is the sense in which it 'needs' company. Do you agree that there is a coherent sense of 'need' here? Does it make sense to say the frog 'needs' partners, even though it wouldn't actually die without them?
Is the sense in which the Rhododendron 'needs' a good frost-sheltered spot, even though it would actually die if more exposed - just lose its blossoms and look stunted and perhaps bedraggled. One objection to factory farming is that it doesn't give the creatures what they need in order to live the life that is characteristic of their species.
If you cage a chicken tightly, and make it stand on wire mesh and cut off its beak, it doesn't actually die - perhaps surprisingly. But it doesn't live the life that is characteristic of the chicken.
We say it doesn't live the life that is ''natural' for a chicken. There is another objection, of course, which is that this treatment makes the chicken suffer. That is true, I think, but put that on one side. Is there another objection, namely that you are stopping the chicken from following a style of living that is natural to it?
What do you think? Concentrate if you can simply on the objection that factory farming methods are 'unnatural' leaving the question of suffering on one side. Is this objection valid? The discussion site would like to hear your arguments. The crunch as far as human beings are concerned is this of course: is there a characteristic pattern of life for the human being? If so, what is good for the human being is whatever helps him or her follow that pattern.
Think of the rhododendron, the frog, the chicken. Is there something for human beings corresponding to the good for these things? If so, what is the pattern of life that is characteristic of Homo Sapiens? If we can identify this we shall know what is good for human beings. What is good for them will be whatever helps them live the life that is characteristic of the species Aristotle answers this by invoking a line of argument that seems flawed.
He asks what it is that is distinctive of human beings. Whatever it is that distinguishes the human being from other species will be the thing that defines what is their characteristic pattern of life. Suppose we found that only human beings could breath successfully in fumes of sulphuric acid.
This would be a distinctive mark, but would it tell us anything about the style of life that was characteristic of the species? Would it tell us what was good for the species? In itself surely not. But if when we studied human beings breathing acid fumes played a large part in many of their lives, we would conclude that this feature would have to be taken account of when giving an account of the pattern of life characteristic of the species.
What Aristotle says is that what is distinctive of the human being is: rationality, or reason. We had better interpret him as saying that the exercise of reason plays a key role in the pattern of life that is characteristic of the human being. Then we can reach the conclusion that allowing ourselves and others to exercise our powers of reasoning is an important good for us. At any rate, as Aristotle looks at the life of the conventional Greek gentleman, he sees that what is characteristic is the life of the mind - as we might say.
This is what he takes to be the characteristic pattern of life for Homo Sapiens - the life of contemplation as he calls it. In the first part of today we are looking for more nuggets in Aristotle and what he says about how we should live, what happiness is and whether it is within everyone's grasp. Since experience is what gives the principles of each science AnPr. This is why logic, though it is employed in all branches of philosophy, is not a part of philosophy.
Rather, in the Aristotelian tradition, logic is an instrument for the philosopher, just as a hammer and anvil are instruments for the blacksmith Ierodiakonou Just as dialectic searches for truth, Aristotelian rhetoric serves as its counterpart Rhet. Thus, rhetorical demonstration, or enthymeme, is a kind of syllogism that strictly speaking belongs to dialectic Rhet. Because rhetoric uses the particularly human capacity of reason to formulate verbal arguments, it is the art that can cause the most harm when it is used wrongly.
It is thus not a technique for persuasion at any cost, as some Sophists have taught, but a fundamentally second-personal way of using language that allows the auditor to reach a judgment Grimaldi , 3—5. More fundamentally, rhetoric is defined as the detection of persuasive features of each subject matter Rhet.
Proofs given in speech depend on three things: the character ethos of the speaker, the disposition pathos of the audience, and the meaning logos of the sounds and gestures used Rhet. Rhetorical proofs show that the speaker is worthy of credence, producing an emotional state pathos in the audience, or demonstrating a consequence using the words alone.
Aristotle holds that ethos is the most important of these elements, since trust in the speaker is required if one is to believe the speech. However, the best speech balances ethos, pathos, and logos. In rhetoric, enthymemes play a deductive role, while examples play an inductive role Rhet. The deductive form of rhetoric, enthymeme, is a dialectical syllogism in which the probable premise is suppressed so that one reasons directly from the necessary premise to the conclusion.
For example, one may reason that an animal has given birth because she has milk Rhet. The inductive form of rhetoric, reasoning from example, can be illustrated as follows.
Peisistratus in Athens and Theagenes in Megara both petitioned for guards shortly before establishing themselves as tyrants. Thus, someone plotting a tyranny requests a guard Rhet.
This proof by example does not have the force of necessity or universality and does not count as a case of scientific induction, since it is possible someone could petition for a guard without plotting a tyranny.
But when it is necessary to base some decision, for example, whether to grant a request for a bodyguard, on its likely outcome, one must look to prior examples.
It is the work of the rhetorician to know these examples and to formulate them in such a way as to suggest definite policies on the basis of that knowledge. Rhetoric is divided into deliberative, forensic, and display rhetoric. Deliberative rhetoric is concerned with the future, namely with what to do, and the deliberative rhetorician is to discuss the advantages and harms associated with a specific course of action.
Forensic rhetoric, typical of the courtroom, concerns the past, especially what was done and whether it was just or unjust. Display rhetoric concerns the present and is about what is noble or base, that is, what should be praised or denigrated Rhet. In all these domains, the rhetorician practices a kind of reasoning that draws on similarities and differences to produce a likely prediction that is of value to the political community.
A common characteristic of insightful philosophers, rhetoricians, and poets is the capacity to observe similarities in things that are unlike, as Archytas did when he said that a judge and an alter are kindred, since someone who has been wronged has recourse to both Rhet.
This noticing of similarities and differences is part of what separates those who are living the good life from those who are merely living Sens. Likewise, the highest achievement of poetry is to use good metaphors, since to make metaphors well is to contemplate what is like Poet. Poetry is thus closely related to both philosophy and rhetoric, though it differs from them in being fundamentally mimetic, imitating reality through an artistic form.
Imitation in poetry is achieved by means of rhythm, language, and harmony Poet. While other arts share some or all these elements—painting imitates visually by the same means, while dance imitates only through rhythm—poetry is a kind of vocalized music, in which voice and discursive meaning are combined.
Aristotle is interested primarily in the kinds of poetry that imitate human actions, which fall into the broad categories of comedy and tragedy.
Comedy is an imitation of worse types of people and actions, which reflect our lower natures. These imitations are not despicable or painful, but simply ridiculous or distorted, and observing them gives us pleasure Poet. Aristotle wrote a book of his Poetics on comedy, but the book did not survive. Hence, through a historical accident, the traditions of aesthetics and criticism that proceed from Aristotle are concerned almost completely with tragedy.
Tragedy imitates actions that are excellent and complete. As opposed to comedy, which is episodic, tragedy should have a single plot that ends in a presentation of pity and fear and thus a catharsis—a cleansing or purgation—of the passions Poet.
The most important aspect of a tragedy is how it uses a story or myth to lead the psyches of its audience to this catharsis Poet. Since the beauty or fineness of a thing—say, of an animal—consists in the orderly arrangement of parts of a definite magnitude Poet. This moment produces pity and fear in the audience, fulfilling the purpose of tragic imitation Poet. The pity and fear produced by imitative poetry are the source of a peculiar form of pleasure Poet. Though the imitation itself is a kind of technique or art, this pleasure is natural to human beings.
Because of this potential to produce emotions and lead the psyche, poetics borders both on what is well natured and on madness Poet. Why do people write plays, read stories, and watch movies? Aristotle thinks that because a series of sounds with minute differences can be strung together to form conventional symbols that name particular things, hearing has the accidental property of supporting meaningful speech, which is the cause of learning Sens.
Poetry picks up on this natural capacity, artfully imitating reality in language without requiring that things are actually the way they are presented as being Poet. Should the poet imitate things as they are, or as they should be? Though it is clear that the standard of correctness in poetry and politics is not the same Poet.
Within theoretical philosophy, first philosophy studies objects that are motionless and separate from material things, mathematics studies objects that are motionless but not separate, and natural philosophy studies objects that are in motion and not separate Met.
This threefold distinction among the beings that can be contemplated corresponds to the level of precision that can be attained by each branch of theoretical philosophy. First philosophy can be perfectly exact because there is no variation among its objects and thus it has the potential to give one knowledge in the most profound sense.
To grasp the nature of a thing is to be able to explain why it was generated essentially: the nature of a thing does not merely contribute to a change but is the primary determinant of the change as such Waterlow , p.
Substantial change occurs when a substance is generated Phys. Ripening occurs when heat burns up the air in the part of the plant near the ground, causing convection that alters the originally light color of the fruit to its dark contrary de Plantis b19— In substantial change, a new primary substance is generated; in non-substantial change, some property of preexisting substance changes to a contrary state. A process of change is completely described when its four causes are given.
The 1 material cause of the change is given when the underlying matter of the thing has been described, such as the bronze matter of which a statue is composed. The 3 efficient cause is given when one says what brought the change about, for example, when one names the sculptor.
The 4 final cause is given when one says the purpose of the change, for example, when one says why the sculptor chose to make the bronze sphere Phys. In natural change the principle of change is internal, so the formal, efficient, and final causes typically coincide. But Cook has shown that the underlying thing normally means matter that already has some form. Indeed, Aristotle claims that the matter of perceptible things has no separate existence but is always already informed by a contrary Gen et Corr.
Thus, even in the most basic cases, matter is always actually informed, even though the form is potentially subject to change. For example, throwing water on a fire cools and moistens it, and bringing about a new quality in the underlying material. In general, Aristotle will describe changes that occur in time as arising from a potential, which is actualized when the change is complete.
However, what is actual is logically prior to what is potential, since a potentiality aims at its own actualization and thus must be defined in terms of what is actual.
Indeed, generically the actual is also temporally prior to potentiality, since there must invariably be a preexisting actuality that brings the potentiality to its own actualization Met. Perhaps because of the priority of the actual to the potential, whenever Aristotle speaks of natural change, he is concerned with a field of naturalistic inquiry that is continuous rather than atomistic and purposeful or teleological rather than mechanical.
In his more specific naturalistic works, Aristotle lays out a program of specialized studies about the heavens and Earth, living things, and the psyche. Since all sublunary bodies move in a rectilinear pattern, the heavenly bodies must be composed of a different body that naturally moves in a circle DC a2—10, Meteor. This body cannot have an opposite, because there is no opposite to circular motion DC a20, compare a19— Aristotle defines time as the number of motion, since motion is necessarily measured by time Phys.
Thus, the motion of the eternal bodies is what makes time, so the life and being of sublunary things depends on them. Noticing that water naturally forms spherical droplets and that it flows towards the lowest point on a plane, Aristotle concludes that both the heavens and the earth are spherical DC b1— This is further confirmed by observations of eclipses DC b23—31 and that different stars are visible at different latitudes DC b14—a Just as in his biology, where Aristotle draws on animal anatomy observed at sacrifices HA b25 and records reports from India HA a25 , so in his astronomy he cites Egyptian and Babylonian observations of the planets DC a4—9.
By gathering evidence from many sources, Aristotle is able to conclude that the stars and the Moon are spherical DC b11—20 and that the Milky Way is an appearance produced by the sight of many stars moving in the outermost sphere Meteor.
Assuming the hypothesis that the Earth does not move DC b6—7 , Aristotle argues that there are in the heavens both stars, which are large and distant from earth, and planets, which are smaller and closer. The two can be distinguished since stars appear to twinkle while planets do not Aristotle somewhat mysteriously attributes the twinkling stars to their distance from the eye of the observer DC b14— Unlike earthly creatures, which move because of their distinct organs or parts, both the moving stars and the unmoving heaven that contains them are spherical DC a30—b As opposed to superlunary eternal substances, sublunary beings, like clouds and human beings, participate in the eternal through coming to be and passing away.
Aristotle holds that the Earth is composed of four spheres, each of which is dominated by one of the four elements. The innermost and heaviest sphere is predominantly earth, on which rests upper spheres of water, air, and fire. The sun acts to burn up or vaporize the water, which rises to the upper spheres when heated, but when cooled later condenses into rain Meteor. If unqualified necessity is restricted to the superlunary sphere, teleology—the seeking of ends that may or may not be brought about—seems to be limited to the sublunary sphere.
Due to his belief that the Earth is eternal, being neither created nor destroyed, Aristotle holds that the epochs move cyclically in patterns of increase and decrease Meteor. Indeed, parts of the world that are ocean periodically become land, while those that are land are covered over by ocean Meteor. Because of periodic catastrophes, all human wisdom that is now sought concerning both the arts and divine things was previously possessed by forgotten ancestors.
However, some of this wisdom is preserved in myths, which pass on knowledge of the divine by allegorically portraying the gods in human or animal form so that the masses can be persuaded to follow laws Met. His theory of the rainbow suggests that drops of water suspended in the air form mirrors which reflect the multiply-colored visual ray that proceeds from the eye without its proper magnitude Meteor.
Though the explanations given by Aristotle of these phenomena contradict those of modern physics, his careful observations often give interest to his account. The phenomenon of life, as opposed to inanimate nature, involves distinctive types of change Phys. Biological explanations should give all four causes of an organism or species—the material of which it is composed, the processes that bring it about, the particular form it has, and its purpose.
For Aristotle, the investigation of individual organisms gives one causal knowledge since the individuals belong to a natural kind. Biology should explain both why homologous forms exist in different species and the ways in which they differ, and therefore the causes for the persistence of each natural kind of living thing. Although all four causes are relevant in biology, Aristotle tends to group final causes with formal causes in teleological explanations, and material causes with efficient causes in mechanical explanations.
Teleological explanations are necessary conditionally; that is, they depend on the assumption that the biologist has correctly identified the end for the sake of which the organism behaves as it does. Mechanical explanations, in distinction, have absolute necessity in the sense that they require no assumptions about the purpose of the organism or behavior.
The final cause of each kind corresponds to the reason that it continues to persist. They are activated, whether consciously or not, for the good of the species, namely for its continuation, in which it imitates the eternal things Gen et Corr. In this way, life can be considered to be directed toward and imitative of the divine DC b18— Perhaps foremost among these is reproduction, which establishes the continuity of a species through a generation.
As Aristotle puts it, the seed is temporally prior to the fully developed organism, since each organism develops from a seed. But the fully developed organism is logically prior to the seed, since it is the end or final cause, for the sake of which the seed is produced PA b29—a2. In asexual reproduction in plants and animals, the seed is produced by an individual organism and implanted in soil, which activates it and thus actualizes its potentiality to become an organism of the kind from which it was produced.
Hence, the natural kind to which an individual belongs makes it what it is. Animals of the same natural kind have the same form of life and can reproduce with one another but not with animals of other kinds.
In animal sexual reproduction, Aristotle understands the seed possessed by the male as the source or principle of generation, which contains the form of the animal and must be implanted in the female, who provides the matter GA a14— In providing the form, the male sets up the formation of the embryo in the matter provided by the female, as rennet causes milk to coagulate into cheese GA a10— Just as rennet causes milk to separate into a solid, earthy part or cheese , and a fluid, watery part or whey , so the semen causes the menstrual fluid to set.
The form of the animal, its psyche, may thus be said to be potentially in the matter, since the matter contains all the necessary nutrients for the production of the complete organism. However, it is invariably the male that brings about the reproduction by providing the principle of the perceptual soul, a process Aristotle compares with the movement of automatic puppets by a mover that is not in the puppet GA b6— Whether the female produces the nutritive psyche is an open question.
Thus, form or psyche is provided by the male, while the matter is provided by the female: when the two come together, they form a hylomorphic product—the living animal. While the form of an animal is preserved in kind by reproduction, organisms are also preserved individually over their natural lifespans through feeding. In species that have blood, feeding is a kind of concoction, in which food is chewed and broken down in the stomach, then enters the blood, and is finally cooked up to form the external parts of the body.
In plants, feeding occurs by the nutritive psyche alone. But in animals, the senses exist for the sake of detecting food, since it is by the senses that animals pursue what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. In human beings, a similar explanation can be given of the intellectual powers: understanding and practical wisdom exist so that human beings might not only live but also enjoy the good life achievable by action Sens.
For example, Haldane shows that Aristotle gave the earliest report of the bee waggle dance, which received a comprehensive explanation only in the 20 th century work of Von Frisch.
Aristotle also observed lordosis behavior in cattle HA b1—2 and notes that some plants and animals are divisible Youth and Old Age b2—15 , a fact that has been vividly illustrated in modern studies of planaria. This is because Aristotle conceives of the psyche as the form of a living being, the body being its material.
Although the psyche and body are never really separated, they can be given different descriptions. For example, the passion of anger can be described physiologically as a boiling of the blood around the heart, while it can be described dialectically as the desire to pay back with pain someone who has insulted one DA a25—b2.
While the physiologist examines the material and efficient causes, the dialectician considers only the form and definition of the object of investigation DA a30—b3. Rather than relying on dialectical or materialist speculation, Aristotle holds that demonstration is the proper method of psychology, since the starting point is a definition DA b25—26 , and the psyche is the form and definition of a living thing. The nutritive psyche—possessed by both plants and animals—is responsible for the basic functions of nourishment and reproduction.
Perception is possible only in an animal that also has the nutritive power that allows it to grow and reproduce, while desire depends on perceiving the object desired, and locomotion depends on desiring objects in different locations DA a1—8. More intellectual powers like imagination, judgment, and understanding itself exist only in humans, who also have the lower powers. The succession of psychological powers ensures the completeness, order, and necessity of the relations of psychological parts.
Like rectilinear figures, which proceed from triangles to quadrilaterals, to pentagons, and so forth, without there being any intermediate forms, there are no other psyches than those in this succession DA b20— This demonstrative approach ensures that although the methods of psychology and physiology are distinct, psychological divisions map onto biological distinctions.
The psyche is defined by Aristotle as the first actuality of a living animal, which is the form of a natural body potentially having life DA a19— This form is possessed even when it is not being used; for example, a sleeping person has the power to hear a melody, though while he is sleeping, he is not exercising the power.
In distinction, though a corpse looks just like a sleeping body, it has no psyche, since it lacks the power to respond to such stimuli. The second actuality of an animal comes when the power is actually exercised such as when one actually hears the melody DA b9— Perception is the reception of the form of an object of perception without its matter, just as wax receives the seal of a ring without its iron or gold DA a17— When one sees wine, for example, one perceives something dark and liquid without becoming dark and liquid.
Others hold that Aristotelian perception is a spiritual change so that no bodily change is required. But presumably one is changing both bodily and spiritually all the time, even when one is not perceiving. In that case, all the doctrine means is that perception is conceptual, giving one a grasp not just of parts of perceptible objects, say, the color and shape of a horse, but of the objects themselves, that is, of the horse as horse.
Indeed, Aristotle describes perception as conferring knowledge of particulars and in that sense being like contemplation DA b19— This theory of perception distinguishes three kinds of perceptible objects: proper sensibles, which are perceived only by one sense modality; common sensibles, which are perceived by all the senses; and accidental sensibles, which are facts about the sensible object that are not directly given DA a8— For example, in seeing wine, its color is a proper sensible, its volume a common sensible, and the fact that it belongs to Callias an accidental sensible.
But this raises a question: how do the different senses work together to give one a coherent experience of reality? If they were not coordinated, then one would perceive each quality of an object separately, for example, darkness and sweetness without putting them together. However, actual perceptual experience is coordinated: one perceives wine as both dark and sweet. When one is awake, and the external sense organs are functioning normally, they are coordinated in the heart to discern reality as being the way it is Sens.
Aristotle claims that one hears that one hears and sees that one sees DA b12— Though there is a puzzle as to whether such higher-order seeing is due to sight itself or to the central perceptual power compare On Sleep a3—26 , the higher-order perception counts as an awareness of how the perceptual power grasps an object in the world.
Indeed, Aristotle describes perceptual powers as being potentially like the perceptual object in actuality DA a3—5 and goes so far as to say that the activity of the external object and that of the perceptual power are one, though what it is to be each one is different DA b26— Thus, consciousness seems to be a property that arises automatically when perception is activated.
In at least some animals, the perceptual powers give rise to other psychological powers that are not themselves perceptual in a strict sense. Far from assuming the constancy of perception, Aristotle notes that under such circumstances, one color can take the place of another and appear differently than it does under standard conditions, for example, of full illumination Meteor. Memory is another power that arises through the collection of many perceptions. Memory is an affection of perception though when the content of the memory is intellectual, it is an affection of the judgmental power of the psyche, see Mem.
Closely related to memory, the imagination is a power to present absent things to oneself. For example, imagining a terror is like looking at a picture without feeling the corresponding emotion of fear DA b21— Imagination may be defined as a kind of change or motion that comes about by means of activated perception DA a1—2. Human beings are distinct from other animals, Aristotle says, in their possession of rational psyche.
Foremost among the rational powers is intellect or understanding this article uses the terms interchangeably , which grasps universals in a way that is analogous to the perceptual grasp of particulars.
However, unlike material particulars grasped by perception, universals are not mixed with body and are thus in a sense contained in the psyche itself DA b22—24, a1—3. This has sometimes been called the intentional inexistence of an object, or intentionality, the property of being directed to or about something.
Since one can think or understand any universal, the understanding is potentially about anything, like an empty writing tablet DA b29—a1. The doctrine of the intentionality of intellect leads Aristotle to make a distinction between two kinds of intellect.
Receptive or passive intellect is characterized by the ability to become like all things and is analogous to the writing tablet. Productive or active intellect is characterized by the ability to bring about all things and is analogous to the act of writing. The active intellect is thus akin to the light that illuminates objects, making them perceptible by sight. Aristotle holds that the soul never thinks without an image produced by imagination to serve as its material.
Thus, in understanding something, the productive intellect actuates the receptive intellect, which stimulates the imagination to produce a particular image corresponding to the universal content of the understanding. Hence, while Aristotle describes the active intellect as unaffected, separate, and immaterial, it serves to bring to completion the passive intellect, the latter of which is inseparable from imagination and hence from perception and nutrition.
Indeed, in Metaphysics b19—30 Aristotle argues that intellect actively understanding the intelligible is the everlasting God. For readers like the medieval Arabic commentator Ibn Rushd , passive intellect is spread like matter among thinking beings. However, in other passages Aristotle says that when the body is destroyed, the soul is destroyed too Length and Shortness of Life , b23— Indeed, Aristotle argues that if thinking is either a kind of imaginative representation or impossible without imagination, then it will be impossible without body DA a8— But the psyche never thinks without imagination DA a16— It seems to follow that far from being a part of the everlasting thinking of God, human thinking is something that happens in a living body and ends when that body is no longer alive.
Thus, Jiminez , 95—99 argues that thinking is embodied in three ways: it is proceeded by bodily processes, simultaneous with embodied processes, and anticipates bodily processes, namely intentional actions. For further discussion see Jiminez The whole psyche governs the characteristic functions and changes of a living thing. The nutritive psyche is the formal cause of growth and metabolism and is shared by plants, while the perceptual psyche gives rise to desire, which causes self-moving animals to act.
When one becomes aware of an apparent good by perception or imagination, one forms either an appetite, the desire for pleasure, or thumos, the spirited desire for revenge or honor. A third form of desire, wish, is the product of the rational psyche DA a20— By characterizing the psyche as he does, Aristotle can at once deny that the psyche is a body but also insist that it does not exist without a body.
But he also rejects nominalism, the view that mathematical things are not real.
0コメント