In a republic who is the head of state

The way in which the presidential nominee has been selected inevitably will become known to the public. The deals will be explained in the press.

The selection process will then be looked upon unfavourably by outsiders, and there will be a demand for direct election to replace this unsavoury process.

Contrary to the minimalist position, a strong case can be made out that a directly elected president would constitute the least change from the current system of government. It is a question of constitutional design. The current system of constitutional monarchy and responsible cabinet government centres on a head of state, the monarch, who is independent of the Parliament.

Apart from occasions of revolution, the Parliament does not choose the monarch. The Crown as an institution is separately constituted.

The theory of constitutional monarchy envisages that the monarch will enjoy wide public support, which will shore up the independence of the Crown.

Governors-general and governors, as representatives of the Crown, were also originally supposed to be independent of Parliament. The change to de facto appointment by the prime minister or premier may have undermined that independence, but the appointees may still be supported by the aura of the Crown.

Having a president appointed by the Parliament, even with a special majority, would remove that independence of the head of state. The head of state would be, and would be seen to be, dependent on the Parliament, or, in reality, on the two major parties. The proposal to have the president removable by the Parliament without stated cause would greatly reinforce that dependence.

A directly elected president, however, would provide a republican replacement for the Crown, with independent public support and no dependence on parliamentary support for appointment or continuance in office. Whenever the possibility of election is mentioned, the official republicans raise the question of the powers of the office.

It is claimed that these powers could not safely be entrusted to an elected president. This is also a curious argument for persons claiming the title of republican. The powers are regarded as safe when vested in an appointee of the prime minister or a nominee of the prime minister approved by a deal with the other major political party, but may not be safely vested in a person independent of the ministry and the Parliament and endorsed by the electorate.

It is more rational to argue that the extensive powers of the office require the independence and popular support of election. This contention is supported by the history of constitutional government. Extensive powers require election; appointed bodies can have only limited powers.

Thus the United States Senate, with its great constitutional powers, was changed from an appointed to an elected body, while the hereditary and appointed House of Lords had its powers taken away. Even if a president is to perform only the role of the governor-general, holding great powers but exercising them according to conventions, this role would seem to require the independence and public support of direct election rather than dependence on the politicians.

The role of a governor-general becomes crucial when responsible government ceases to work: when a lower house is incapable of supporting any ministry, when a prime minister refuses to resign or advise an election upon loss of the support of the lower house, and in similar situations.

Many such cases have occurred, including recent cases in Australia. An effective republican umpire to resolve such situations requires independence and public support in substitution for the residual prestige of the Crown.

The powers of the governor-general are exercised in accordance with the practices, precedents and conventions associated with responsible government. Scrupulous observance of these in a republic is more likely by an independent president than by one beholden to the politicians. In short, considerations of institutional design, including the contention that we must follow the scheme of the existing system as far as possible, indicate that a president dependent on the major parties is the most unsound option, and that direct election achieves both of the aims of institutional balance and as little change as practicable to the existing system.

The head of state and popular sovereignty. It is said that we must have an indigenous head of state to be a symbol of the nation, to represent Australia and its people, and to represent the people to themselves. It is not clear how such an exalted role can be performed by any officeholder unless the office has a strong and close link with the people, or how such a link can be attained except through popular election.

It is highly unlikely that such a role could be performed by a person appointed by the politicians. Governors-general, without the handicap of being appointed by subterranean political deals, have not been able fully to perform such a task; one has the feeling that in recent years they have been less conspicuous to the people than in the past.

It is also said that popular election will lead to a party contest and the election of a party politician, and that a person selected by this process will be incapable of properly performing the role of national symbol or that of constitutional umpire.

It is somewhat contradictory so to imply that an elected president would follow the partisan interests or instructions of the party which nominated and campaigned for him or her, while it is supposed that a president appointed as a result of a deal between the major parties would not suffer from a similar, and more debilitating, dependence.

It is a non sequitur that a president elected after a party contest would be incapable of performing the required role. To a certain extent the function of representing the nation as a whole is performed by the prime minister of the day, who is invited to make inspiring speeches and to launch great events, perhaps more often than the governor-general.

A party politician elected to the presidency, and without the responsibility of actually exercising executive power, would be more capable in that regard than a prime minister. Such a president would be likely very quickly to become a former party politician transformed by the high office. This occurred, after all, with Mr Hayden and his politician-predecessors to a large degree.

In any case, it does not follow that the electors would vote for party politicians. The unstated premise here is that the electorate would be incapable of distinguishing between an election to choose a government to carry out favoured policies and an election to choose a head of state. It is more likely that the voters, if presented with the choice of non-party candidates, would forsake the established political parties and return persons without partisan attachments.

It would be important to ensure that the ability to nominate candidates is not confined to political parties in or out of Parliament. The political parties would then be likely to follow the signals of the voters and nominate or support attractive non-party candidates. In order to facilitate this effect, it may be desirable to restrict campaign spending by political parties in presidential elections.

It also does not follow that, as has been repeatedly stated by exalted personages in recent times, that an elected presidency would preclude the choice of distinguished persons. Other republics. These contentions are supported somewhat by an examination of the established republics of the world. The number of stable republics with constitutions that have functioned for reasonable periods without major unconstitutional episodes is relatively small, but so is the number of stable, democratic constitutional monarchies.

Four of these countries have executive presidencies: the United States with a pure executive presidency, and Botswana, Finland and France with hybrid systems in which the government is carried on by ministers in the legislature but in which the president also exercises executive power.

Switzerland has a separately constituted, but not directly elected, collegiate executive quite different from a parliamentary cabinet. Laurel stayed in office from to when the Second Republic was abolished.

At this point, the President of the Second Republic would overlap with the President of the Commonwealth. On September 17, , however, the laws of the Second Republic were declared null and void by the Supreme. President Roxas was elected in as the third President of the Philippine Commonwealth, first President of the independent Republic of the Philippines, and the fifth President of the Philippines.

He would usher in the end of the Philippine Commonwealth on July 4, , and the birth of the Third Republic. Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal as the second, third, fourth, and fifth President of the Third Republic and the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth President of the Philippines, respectively. President Ferdinand E. Marcos became the first President of the Fourth Republic and the tenth President of the Philippines overall.

Marcos stayed in office for 20 years—the longest serving President of the Philippines. President Aquino served as the second and last President of the Fourth Republic at the beginning of her term. A transitional, Freedom Constitution was put into effect in the same year. When the Constitution was put into full force and effect, the Fourth Republic was ended and the Fifth Republic inaugurated. She would be followed by Presidents Fidel V. Aquino III as the second, third, fourth, and fifth President of the Fifth Republic and 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th President of the Philippines, respectively.

Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the Philippines are specifically outlined in Executive Order No. The following powers are:. The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their respective officials. The President of the Philippines has the power to give executive issuances, which are means to streamline the policy and programs of an administration.

There are six issuances that the President may issue. They are the following as defined in the Administrative Code of Executive orders — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Administrative orders — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as the administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Proclamations — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Memorandum orders — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail, or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or government office shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Memorandum circulars — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

General or special orders — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. It is important to note that during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used executive issuances known as presidential decrees as a form of legislation.

These decrees have the full force and effect of laws because at the time the legislature did not exist and, when the Constitution was put into full force and effect, it gave the power to the President to do as such. This continued until the first year of President Corazon C.

However, President Aquino opted to used executive orders instead of presidential decrees. The President of the Philippines has certain powers over non-Filipinos in the Philippines. The powers he may exercise over foreigners in the country are as follows:. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domains means the state has the power to seize or authorize the seizure of private property for public use with just compensation. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 2 , provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the power of eminent domain which are as follows:.

Power of eminent domain — The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the national government, and direct the solicitor general, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court. Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings — The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred or assigned to persons disqualified under the constitution to acquire land.

Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government —. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. Power over ill-gotten wealth — The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees.

Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the constitution, the President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime, and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. The President may appoint officials of the Philippine government as provided by the constitution and laws of the Philippines.

Some of these appointments, however, may need the approval of the Committee on Appointments a committee composed of members from the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines. The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the mandate to supervise local governments in the Philippines, despite their autonomous status as provided by Republic Act No.

Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and Local Government, headed by a cabinet secretary—an alter ego of the President. Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the Philippines, he can also exercise powers enumerated in the constitution, and powers given to him by law. The constitution provides for a line of succession in the event that the elected President of the Philippines is not able to discharge the duties of his office due to death, disability, or resignation.

The following is the line of succession:. The Congress of the Philippines is mandated enact a law calling for a special election three days after the vacancy in the Office of the President and Vice President.

Alternatively,— within 20 days in the case of legislation enacted by the Assembly of the Republic, or 40 days in the case of governmental legislation, reckoned in both cases as from the date of reception of the legislation by the president or from the date of publication of the Constitutional Court decision ruling the unconstitutionality — he may veto the legislation politically, that is, return it without promulgation to the body that approved it, stating, by means of a reasoned message, his political opposition to the content or timeliness of the legislation political veto may also be exercised in the event that the Constitutional Courts ruling is that there is no unconstitutionality.

A political veto is absolute in the case of governmental legislation, but it is merely relative in the case of legislation enacted by the Assembly of the Republic.

That is, while the government is bound to comply with the political veto and must therefore scrap the legislation or introduce the amendments proposed by the president, the Assembly of the Republic may get round the veto — and the president is obliged to promulgate it within 8 days if the legislation is again approved, without amendment, by a greater majority: as a rule the absolute majority of the Deputies or, in the case of more important legislation, by a two-thirds majority organic laws, other electoral laws, laws concerning foreign relations, among others.

This means that in certain cases a political veto by the president will oblige the main political parties having a seat in the Assembly of the Republic to reach agreement if they are to overturn the veto. Also with regard to regulatory legislation, the president may at any time request the Constitutional Court to declare the unconstitutionality, with general mandatory force, of any legal rule in force abstract successive control — with its consequent elimination from Portuguese law — or request that it verify whether there is any unconstitutionality as a result of omission that is, a failure to comply with the Constitution as a result of omission of a legislative measure required to make a given constitutional rule enforceable.

His powers are much closer to the idea of a moderating power particularly his powers of control or negative powers, such as the veto, although the Head of State, besides these duties, also has competence in political guidance, especially in the event of political crises, in times of a state of exception and in matters of defence and international relations.

However, over and above this, the President of the Republic may make particularly intense use of the symbolic attributes of his position and of his important informal powers. All the ceremonies he attends, his speeches, his communications to the country, his travels in Portugal and abroad, his interviews, his audiences or contacts with the people, these are all political opportunities of extraordinary scope in mobilising the country and the citizens.

This tool also allows you to translate all the contents of this website into English and 17 other languages, including the News area, which is only available in Portuguese. Who is the President of the Republic and what does he do? The President of the Republic is the Head of State. In matters of relations with the Assembly of the Republic, the president may address messages to the Assembly, thus calling its attention to any matter that, in his view, calls for intervention by Parliament.